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1978] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
in Auerbach would invite collusion between corporate directors and
stockholders, as it would enable directors to squelch litigation by
exerting influence over the party prosecuting it.1
s
John H. Beers
ARTICLE 31-DIscLosuRE
CPLR 3101: Pre-trial disclosure on the issue of child custody in a
,matrimonial action denied
CPLR 3101, New York's disclosure statute, provides that a
party has a right to "all evidence material and necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action." 9 Notwithstanding this broad
unappealed decision in one action at nisi prius. But neither the stockholder plain-
tiffs, the corporation, nor the defendants have found that remedy appropriate for
one reason or another. In the circumstances, the intervention by Wallenstein should
be permitted and his timely filing of an appeal effectuated by the hearing of the
argument on the merits.
64 App. Div. 2d at 105-06, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
" The potential for collusion between corporate directors and stockholders was described
by the second department over 40 years ago:
It would be very easy for offending officers and directors to obtain a friendly stock-
holder to begin an action and to suppress all information on the subject. The
defendants and not stockholders would then be in control of the litigation. If the
doctrine here advocated by the defendants prevails, all other stockholders are pre-
vented from bringing actions in good faith - unless to their already great difficul-
ties, . . . they must have added the duty of establishing by proof that the first
action is in fact collusive. If other stockholders without intervention rely on the first
action to furnish a remedy to all, then it may be permitted to drag along until the
Statute of Limitations has run and be discontinued on a private settlement or
otherwise; and other stockholders will be left remediless.
Dresdner v. Goldman Sachs Trading Corp., 240 App. Div. 242, 247-48, 269 N.Y.S. 360, 367
(2d Dep't 1934). See generally McLaughlin, Capacity of Plaintiff-Stockholder to Terminate
a Stockholder's Suit, 46 YALE L.J. 421 (1936). The problem discussed by the Dresdner court
has been alleviated to some extent by N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 626(d) (McKinney 1963), which
prohibits pre-judgment termination of derivative actions without approval of the trial court.
The dilemma persists, however, in cases such as Auerbach, where the initial plaintiff prose-
cutes the action at the trial level but refuses to pursue a meritorious argument to the appellate
level. It is submitted that the Auerbach holding represents a practical solution in these
situations.
CPLR 3101(a) provides in pertinent part that "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all
evidence material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the
burden of proof. ... Under the statute, only privileged matter, attorneys' work product
and materials prepared solely for litigation are specifically exempted from the general rule
of full disclosure. CPLR 3101(b)-(d) (1970). See also note 97 infra.
CPLR 3101(a) was originally enacted as a temporary replacement for its predecessor, §
288 of the Civil Practice Act, ch. 926, [19201 N.Y. Laws 521. Although further study was
contemplated, the original language has never been changed and the legislative intent under-
lying the statute remains unclear. 3A WK&M 3101.01. The courts, however, consistently
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statutory language, many courts traditionally have prohibited dis-
closure in matrimonial actions on the premise that it might hinder
reconciliation." While this prohibition was modified by the enact-
ment of DRL § 250, which makes disclosure of financial information
compulsory,91 it has remained uncertain whether the legislature's
have stated that the purpose of CPLR 3101 is to provide liberal disclosure and expedite court
proceedings. See Goldner v. Lendor Structures, Inc., 29 App. Div. 2d 978, 289 N.Y.S.2d 687
(2d Dep't 1968); Schaeffer v. Schaeffer, 70 Misc. 2d 1033, 335 N.Y.S.2d 510 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1972).
0 See, e.g., Freed v. Freed, 41 App. Div. 2d 606, 340 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1st Dep't 1973) (per
curiam); Nomako v. Ashton, 20 App. Div. 2d 331, 247 N.Y.S.2d 230 (1st Dep't 1964) (per
curiam); Wightman v. Wightman, 7 App. Div. 2d 859, 182 N.Y.S.2d 31 (2d Dep't 1959);
Tausik v. Tausik, 280 App. Div. 887, 115 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1st Dep't 1952) (mem.). The tradi-
tional rationale for limiting discovery in matrimonial actions was articulated in Hunter v.
Hunter, 10 App. Div. 2d 291, 198 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1st Dep't 1960), where the court stated that
pre-trial examination could be an "exacerbating" circumstance tending to reduce the possi-
bility of reconciliation between the parties. Id. at 294, 198 N.Y.S.2d at 1012. The Hunter court
also noted that a wife, by demanding extensive financial disclosure, could use discovery to
harass her husband and place him in an awkward position with business relations and credi-
tors. Id. at 293, 198 N.Y.S.2d at 1012. This rationale was overridden, however, by the enact-
ment of DRL § 250. Ch. 690, § 1, [1975] N.Y. Laws 1103 (McKinney), amended, ch. 691, §
1, [1975] N.Y. Laws 1104 (McKinney); see note 91 infra. See generally J. Zarr, M. EDMONDS
& S. SCHwARTz, NEW YORK CIviL PRACTICE § 35.03[4] (1976).
DRL § 250 provides in pertinent part:
In all matrimonial actions and proceedings commenced on or after [Sept. 1,
19751 .. .in which alimony or support is in issue and all support proceedings in
family court, there shall be compulsory disclosure by both parties of their respective
financial states. No showing of special circumstances shall be required before such
disclosure is ordered.
DRL § 250 (Supp. 1978-1979) (emphasis added). Prior to the adoption of DRL § 250, the
judicial departments were divided on the issue of financial disclosure in matrimonial actions.
Lower courts within the third and fourth departments did not develop special discovery rules
for matrimonial actions and allowed financial, as well as non-financial, disclosure pursuant
to CPLR 3101(a) unless special circumstances justified the issuance of a protective order. See
Pizzo v. Pizzo, 33 Misc. 2d 1022, 227 N.Y.S.2d 399 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1962); Berlin v.
Berlin, 17 Misc. 2d 768, 187 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1959); Szymanski v.
Szymanski, 16 Misc. 2d 398, 183 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1959). In contrast, the
second department did not permit financial discovery in contested divorce actions unless the
party seeking disclosure demonstrated special circumstances. In uncontested actions, how-
ever, pre-trial financial examinations generally were allowed. See Plancher v. Plancher, 35
App. Div. 2d 417, 317 N.Y.S.2d 140 (2d Dep't 1970), aff'd mem., 29 N.Y.2d 880, 278 N.E.2d
650, 328 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1972); Campbell v. Campbell, 7 App. Div. 2d 1011, 184 N.Y.S.2d 479
(2d Dep't 1959) (per curiam). The second department's approach was adopted by the first
department in Stem v. Stem, 39 App. Div. 2d 87, 332 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1st Dep't 1972). Accord,
Legname v. Legname, 43 App. Div. 2d 543, 349 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1st Dep't 1973); Mandelbaum
v. Mandelbaum, 42 App. Div. 2d 531, 344 N.Y.S.2d 809 (1st Dep't 1973) (per curiam);
Meyerhoff v. Meyerhoff, 41 App. Div. 2d 726, 341 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1st Dep't 1973). The split in
authority was resolved with the enactment of DRL § 250. The most notable change occurred
in the first and second departments where the statute eliminated the incentive to raise an
issue over custody to create a "contested" action aild thereby avoid financial disclosure.
Even after the adoption of § 250, however, some remnants of the former restrictive policy
persisted in cases involving financial disclosure. While the first department consistently held
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permissive discovery policy would be followed by the courts in deter-
mining whether to permit non-financial disclosure in matrimonial
actions.92 Recently, in P. v. P.,11 the Supreme Court, New York
County, followed the traditional restrictive view and denied pre-
trial discovery in a divorce proceeding on the issue of child custody.9"
P. v. P. involved a divorce action instituted by the wife. 5 The
defendant-husband, who strongly opposed the divorce and had at-
tempted to revive the marriage, tried to obtain information on the
issue of child custody.9" The plaintiff refused to answer questions
pertaining to this issue and moved for a protective order against
further discovery.97 In considering the plaintiff's motion, Justice
that pre-trial examination is not limited to the "sworn statement of net worth," prescribed
in the statute, see Billet v. Billet, 53 App. Div. 2d 564, 384 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1st Dep't 1976);
Perse v. Perse, 52 App. Div. 2d 60, 382 N.Y.S.2d 758 (lst Dep't 1976); Hoppl v. Hoppl, 50
App. Div. 2d 59, 376 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1st Dep't 1975), the second department initially took the
position that the filing of a financial statement would satisfy the statutory disclosure require-
ment. Hausman v. Hausman, 51 App. Div. 2d 796, 380 N.Y.S.2d 66 (2d Dep't 1976). In
subsequent cases, lower courts within the second department interpreted Hausman to mean
that examination beyond the sworn statement would not be allowed unless the statement was
inadequate. Peck v. Peck, N.Y.L.J., June 25, 1976, at 11, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County);
Testa v. Testa, N.Y.L.J., May 28, 1976, at 10, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County). In Rubin v.
Rubin, 89 Misc. 2d 245, 391 N.Y.S.2d 37 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1976), the court suggested
that Hausman was not good 4uthority for a restrictive reading of DRL § 250, since that case
arose prior to the statute's effective date. This position apparently was adopted in Schwartz
v. Schwartz, 59 App. Div. 2d 904, 399 N.Y.S.2d 139 (2d Dep't 1977).
12 Since the enactment of DRL § 250, see note 91 supra, at least one court has discarded
the traditional rule of non-disclosure and permitted discovery of non-financial information
in a divorce action. Maxwell v. Maxwell, 88 Misc. 2d 535, 389 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County 1976). The Maxwell court held that the liberal disclosure policies of CPLR 3101
should be followed in all actions, with restrictions imposed only on a case-by-case basis. Id.
at 537-38, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 86. In Billet v. Billet, 53 App. Div. 2d 564, 564, 384 N.Y.S.2d 826,
827 (1st Dep't 1976), however, the court stated that DRL § 250 did not change "the long-
standing rule that examination with respect to the grounds upon which a divorce or separa-
tion is sought may not be permitted."
93 Misc. 2d 704, 403 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978).
Id. at 706, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
Id. at 704, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
Id. The defendant issued subpoenas duces tecum to two non-party witnesses pursuant
to CPLR 2301.
11 Id. at 704-05, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 682. The P. v. P. court issued a protective order pursuant
to CPLR 3103(a), which provides:
The court may at any time on its own initiative, or on motion of any party or
witness, make a protective order denying, limiting, conditioning or regulating the
use of any disclosure device. Such order shall be designed to prevent unreasonable
annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice to any per-
son or the courts.
Under the statutory scheme, the party seeking the protective order must demonstrate the
presence of special circumstances warranting protection. The determination is made by the
trial court, in exercise of its discretion, but "there is no definitive and absolute rule, no fixed
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Blyn recognized the trend toward liberal matrimonial disclosure"
but stated that the court would adhere to the "controlling view in
the First Department. . . prohibiting the discovery of information
concerning the merits of a matrimonial action.""9 In support of this
position, the court observed that the defendant's repeated attempts
to save the marriage and the couple's continued cohabitation dem-
onstrated that reconciliation remained a possibility."'0 Furthermore,
addressing the specific issue of child custody, Justice Blyn reasoned
that "no matter what the outcome of this matrimonial proceeding
the parties will still be bound to each other for life as parents ....
Pre-trial examinations . . .on the issue of custody can only serve
to make such a future relationship even more difficult . . . ."I"
Thus, Justice Blyn concluded that disclosure should not be required
yardstick used to determine what are 'special circumstances.' "Mook v. Mook, 13 App. Div.
2d 465, 467, 212 N.Y.S.2d 21, 24 (1st Dep't 1961) (per curiam); see Barlett v. Sanford, 244
App. Div. 722, 278 N.Y.S.2d 578 (2d Dep't 1935). "Special circumstances" justifying discov-
ery have been found in divorce actions involving hostile witnesses, see Weber v. Weber, 40
Misc. 2d 730, 243 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1963), actions for annulment based
on the allegation of a pre-existing marriage, see Argondizza v. Argondizza, 284 App. Div. 976,
134 N.Y.S.2d 905 (2d Dep't 1954) (per curiam), and actions contesting the validity of a foreign
divorce, see O'Donovan v. O'Donovan, 41 Misc. 2d 82, 244 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1963).
" Id. at 705, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 682; see Maxwell v. Maxwell, 88 Misc. 2d 535, 389 N.Y.S.2d
84 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1976); Schaeffer v. Schaeffer, 70 Misc. 2d 1033, 335 N.Y.S.2d
510 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972); Pizzo v. Pizzo, 33 Misc. 2d 1022, 227 N.Y.S.2d 399 (Sup.
Ct. Monroe County 1962); Szymanski v. Szymanski, 16 Misc. 2d 398, 183 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Sup.
Ct. Erie County 1959).
11 93 Misc. 2d at 705, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 682. The P. v. P. court relied upon Billet v. Billet,
53 App. Div. 2d 564, 384 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1st Dep't 1976), in which the first department
reaffirmed its adherence to the traditional non-disclosure rule in cases not governed by DRL
§ 250. See note 92 supra.
" 93 Misc. 2d at 705-06, 403 NY.S.2d at 682. The P. v. P. court noted that the
defendant-husband had attested to "'partially successful' attempts at reconciliation" in his
affidavit submitted in opposition to the plaintiff's motion. Id. (quoting Brief for Defendant,
at 2.)
01 93 Misc. 2d at 706, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 682. Justice Blyn emphasized the special role
played by the courts when the custody of a minor child is at issue. Id. In such cases the courts
sometimes assume the role of parens patriae to ensure the minor's welfare and safety. See,
e.g., Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925); Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 278 App.
Div. 446, 106 N.Y.S.2d 237 (3d Dep't 1951); Abreu v. Abreu, 46 Misc. 2d 942, 261 N.Y.S.2d
687 (Family Ct. Ulster County 1965); In re Richman, 32 Misc. 2d 1090, 227 N.Y.S.2d 42 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1962). Under DRL § 240, a court trying a matrimonial matter is empowered
to make a custody determination reflecting "the best interests of the child." See, e.g., Safchik
v. Safchik, 54 App. Div. 2d 928, 388 N.Y.S.2d 321 (2d Dep't 1976). In addition, custody may
be determined in a separate habeas corpus proceeding brought by a parent or grandparent
under DRL § 70. See, e.g., People v. Harold J.D., 53 App. Div. 2d 620, 384 N.Y.S.2d 30 (2d
Dep't 1976) (per curiam). In such cases, the statute requires the court to award custody solely
on the basis of the child's "best interest . . . and what will best promote its welfare and
happiness." DRL § 70 (1977).
[Vol. 53:107
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and granted the plaintiff's motion. 02
The blanket non-disclosure rule apparently endorsed by the P.
v. P. court was developed at a time when New York had extremely
restrictive divorce laws. 0 3 The rule was based upon a judicial con-
cern that extensive discovery on the merits of a matrimonial action
would exacerbate the conflict between the parties and interfere with
any possible reconciliation. °4 It is submitted, however, that chang-
ing social and legal attitudes toward divorce have severely eroded
the significance of reconciliation as a public policy.'05 Several courts
have rejected this policy as an insufficient basis for a categorical
exception to general disclosure rules and, absent a showing of spe-
cial circumstances, permit discovery of "all of the relevant and ma-
terial allegations of fact put in issue by the pleadings."'0 6 Moreover,
the legislature's enactment of DRL § 250, which requires disclosure
'2 93 Misc. 2d at 706, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
"I Until the enactment of the Divorce Reform Bill of 1966, ch. 254, §§ 1-5, [19661 N.Y.
Laws 265 (McKinney); see note 105 infra, adultery was the only ground for divorce in New
York. See Gleason v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 256 N.E.2d 513, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1970). See
generally ZErr, EDMONDS & ScHwARTz, supra note 90, § 18.01.
204 See note 90 supra.
' With the enactment of the Divorce Reform Bill of 1966, ch. 254, §§ 1-15, [1966] N.Y.
Laws 265 (McKinney), the legislature abandoned its prior restrictive approach to divorce, see
note 103 supra, and initiated a new, relatively permissive policy. The new law, embodied in
DRL § 170, permits divorce on grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment, abandonment,
adultery, or confinement of a spouse in prison for at least 3 years. In addition, the parties
may obtain a so-called "no-fault divorce" if they are separated for at least 1 year pursuant
to a decree or a written separation agreement.
As originally enacted, the Divorce Reform Bill of 1966 provided for mandatory concilia-
tion under the auspices of a state-operated Conciliation Bureau. No divorce would be placed
on the court calendar until the Bureau verified that conciliation was not possible, or until
120 days had passed. See ch. 254, § 215, [1966] N.Y. Laws 268 (McKinney). Since the
mandatory conciliation procedure minimized the possibility that a salvageable marriage
would 'reach the trial stage of a divorce proceeding, there seemed to be little justification for
preserving the traditional restrictions on pre-trial disclosure. See CPLR 3101, commentary
at 15 (Supp. 1978-1979). As a consequence, some courts were willing to relax the traditionally
stringent standards for permitting discovery in matrimonial actions. See, e.g., Dunlap v.
Dunlap, 34 App. Div. 2d 889, 312 N.Y.S.2d 441 (4th Dep't 1970); Lachoff v. Lachoff, 69 Misc.
2d 512, 330 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972) (per curiam). Although the concilia-
tion provision was ultimately repealed because it was found ineffective, ch. 1034, § 2, 119731
N.Y. Laws 1888 (McKinney); see EIGHTEENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JuD. CONFERENCE (1973), at
least one court has concluded that "the evolving liberalization evidence[d] by Dunlap and
the cases following it" should not be reversed. Maxwell v. Maxwell, 88 Misc. 2d 535, 537, 389
N.Y.S.2d 84, 85 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1976). The changing judicial attitude toward
divorce also was expressed in Gleason v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 39, 256 N.E.2d 513, 519, 308
N.Y.S.2d 347, 354 (1970), wherein the Court of Appeals stated that "it is socially and morally
undesirable to compel a couple whose marriage is dead to remain subject to its bonds."
114 Szymanski v. Szymanski, 16 Misc. 2d 398, 398, 183 N.Y.S.2d 503, 504 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1959); see notes 91-92 supra.
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of financial material, reflects a clear shift in public policy toward
expanded discovery in matrimonial actions.'0 7
In light of these changes, it would appear that a re-examination
of the long-standing non-disclosure rule is warranted.' 8 Modem dis-
covery rules are designed to permit broad pre-trial disclosure unless
it would be abusive or unnecessary. '"'9 Moreover, the courts have
"inherent and statutory powers" to limit discovery when appropri-
ate."1" Thus, a presumption in favor of liberal discovery seems better
suited to effectuating the general purposes of CPLR 3101 in matri-
monial actions. It is submitted, however, that such a presumption
would not be appropriate where custody is at issue. In such cases,
even if reconciliation is not a significant possibility, there would still
be a need to minimize discord between the parties to protect the
child's best interests. Accordingly, the traditionally broad restric-
tions on discovery in matrimonial actions appears justified in cases
involving custody of a minor.
While reconciliation remains a desirable goal, it no longer
seems an adequate basis for prohibiting non-financial disclosure in
all matrimonial suits. It is suggested that, where child custody is not
an issue, the courts should discard the traditional non-disclosure
rule in favor of a case-by-case approach"' which would balance the
,"7 See Hoppl v. Hoppl, 50 App. Div. 2d 59, 376 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1st Dep't 1975); notes
91-92 supra. While DRL § 250 is expressly made applicable only to matrimonial actions
commenced on or after Sept. 1, 1975, courts have held that it is not an abuse of discretion to
apply the liberal disclosure policy underlying the statute and permit financial examination
in suits initiated before the statute's effective date. Billet v. Billet, 53 App. Div. 2d 564, 384
N.Y.S.2d 826 (1st Dep't 1976); Perse v. Perse, 52 App. Div. 2d 60, 382 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1st Dep't
1976); Schneiderman v. Schneiderman, 51 App. Div. 2d 914, 380 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1st Dep't
1976); Hausman v. Hausman, 51 App. Div. 2d 796, 380 N.Y.S.2d 66 (2d Dep't 1976); Meltzer
v. Meltzer, 87 Misc. 2d 1006, 387 N.Y.S.2d 43 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1976).
101 See CPLR 3101, commentary at 7 (Supp. 1978-1979); 3A WK&M T 3101.19.
tO See notes 89 & 97 supra.
,,o 93 Misc. 2d at .706, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 682; see Maxwell v. Maxwell, 88 Misc. 2d 535,
389 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1976); note 97 supra. In Wegman v. Wegman, 37
N.Y.2d 940, 343 N.E.2d 288, 380 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1975), the Court of Appeals upheld the
lower court's decision to allow a pre-trial physical examination in a divorce action and stated
that "the court's broad discretionary power to grant a protective order . . . should provide
adequate safeguards" against abuse. Id. at 941, 343 N.E.2d at 288, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 649.
Although examination was sought pursuant to CPLR 3121, it is submitted that the Weg-
man Court's reasoning is applicable to requests for disclosure under CPLR 3101. Physical
examination is a form of discovery that is particularly subject to abuse. If the discretionary
power of a court to issue a protective order is an adequate safeguard in this area, it should
also be considered an adequate safeguard when less intrusive forms of disclosure are de-
manded under the general mandate of CPLR 3101.
"I See, e.g., Maxwell v. Maxwell, 88 Misc. 2d 535, 389 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County 1976); Schaeffer v. Schaeffer, 70 Misc. 2d 1033, 335 N.Y.S.2d 510 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1972).
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liberal disclosure policies expressed in CPLR 3101 against the effect
that extensive discovery might have on the parties in a matrimonial
action.
Audrey Rogers
ARTICLE 32-ACCELERATED JUDGMENT
CPLR 3215: A defendant in default is entitled to an assessment of
damages on the question of reasonable cover
Under CPLR 3215, a default judgment may be obtained against
a defendant who has failed to proceed in an action.112 Once the
defendant has conceded liability by defaulting, the plaintiff must
apply to the court for a judgment, and an inquest must be con-
ducted to determine damages.' If the plaintiff's claim is for a "sum
certain," however, the statute authorizes the court clerk to enter a
judgment without further hearing.1 Recently, in Reynolds Securi-
ties, Inc. v. Underwriters Bank & Trust Co.," 5 the Court of Appeals
clarified the scope of the right to automatic entry of judgment,
holding that a defaulting defendant in a contract action is entitled
to an inquest when the plaintiff requests reimbursement for the
,,2 CPLR 3215(a) (1970) provides:
When a defendant has failed to appear, plead or proceed to trial of an action
reached and called for trial, or when the court orders a dismissal for any other
neglect to proceed, the plaintiff may seek a default judgment against him. If the
plaintiff's claim is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made
certain, application may be made to the clerk within one year after the default. The
clerk, upon submission of the requisite proof, shall enter judgment for the amount
demanded in the complaint or stated in the notice served pursuant to subdivision
(b) of rule 305, plus costs and interest . . . .Where the case is not one in which
the clerk can enter judgment, the plaintiff shall apply to the court for judgment.
"' CPLR 3215(a) (1970). CPLR 3215(b) (1970) gives the court the authority to make
findings of fact on the issue of damages or to direct the question to a jury or a referee. In
order to establish his right to entry of judgment, the plaintiff must "file proof of service of
the summons and the complaint, or a summons and notice. . . and proof by affidavit...
of the facts constituting the claim, the default and the amount due." CPLR 3215(e) (1970).
If a verified complaint was served, it may be used in place of an affidavit. Id. Where the
statute requires the application for entry of judgment to be made to the court, a defendant
who has appeared in the action must be given at least 5 days notice of the time and place of
the application. If the defendant has not appeared, notice is required only if the defendant
serves a written demand on the plaintiff. CPLR 3215(f)(1)-(2) (1970). Where the application
can be made to the court clerk no form of notice is required, CPLR 3215(f)(1) (1970).
"I See note 112 supra. Where the plaintiffs claim is for a sum certain, the court clerk
may enter judgment without notice to the defendant upon the plaintiff's submission of proof
of service of process and an affidavit or verified complaint supporting his request for damages.
CPLR 3215(e)-(f) (1970).
Is 44 N.Y.2d 568, 378 N.E.2d 106, 406 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1978), rev'g 57 App. Div. 2d 522,
393 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1st Dep't 1977).
